Competitive Intelligence

9/11 Commission (Intelligence) Report: Failure of Imagination or Failure of Incentives?

The commission's 585-page report indicates much greater failures than imagination in the national intelligence apparatus throughout both the Clinton and Bush presidencies. Slate.com's Fred Kaplan offers up his excellent analysis:

The biggest puzzle about the 9/11 commission's report is why Thomas Kean, the panel's chairman, said at the start of his press conference this morning that the U.S. government's failure to stop the attack on the World Trade Center was, "above all, a failure of imagination."

It was a strange comment because the actual report—a superb, if somewhat dry, piece of work—says nothing of the sort. The failure was not one of imagination but rather of incentives. It turns out that many individuals, panels, and agencies had predicted an attack uncannily similar to what happened on Sept. 11, 2001. The problem was that nobody in a position of power felt compelled to do anything about it.

And, in conclusion:

Everything that the panel wants to do has been tried, in one way or another, in the past. The government doesn't change in so dramatic a fashion unless the president pushes hard for the change. New priorities mean nothing unless budgets reflect them. New superagencies mean nothing unless their managers have the power to control the purse strings of their constituent parts. Better intelligence means nothing unless the president wants to hear it—and at least seriously considers acting on it.

Will a Cabinet-level intelligence czar be able to sort out all the trouble getting agencies to cooperate? One thing's for sure, that stands a lot better chance than teaching them to be more imaginative.

- Arik